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Since its enactment in 1978, chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code has been the prototype for what a corporate 
reorganization procedure should look like.  And given the broad 
potential reach of the American Bankruptcy Code—applicable both 
to assets “wherever located,”1  and debtors owning only a modest 
amount of assets in the United States—2  chapter 11 also seems like 
it should be a leading tool for restructuring global businesses as 
well.3 
But we use this short paper to examine why chapter 15 has 
instead become the preferred tool of global reorganization.4  While 
chapter 15 represents a vital part of this new regime, it represents a 
smaller portion of the overall restructuring architecture as compared 
with a “pure” chapter 11 restructuring of global businesses.  
Whether that is good or bad largely depends on where one stands.5 
As we discuss in closing, it is also possible that chapter 11’s 
time will come, but that largely depends on deep changes in debt 
markets, which may or may not come to pass.  For the present, 
chapter 15 is clearly dominant in America’s contribution to global 
restructuring. 
I. Introduction 
In the United States, chapter 11 has dominated the corporate 
restructuring landscape largely because it has never required that the 
debtor-firm show its own insolvency to commence proceedings.6  
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 2 Id. § 109. Indeed, caselaw makes clear that any amount of property in the United 
States will satisfy the requirements of the section. As one New York bankruptcy court 
summarized, “Section 109(a) says nothing about the amount of such property nor does it 
direct that there be any inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s acquisition 
of the property.” In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., 520 B.R. 399, 413 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quotation omitted). 
 3 See generally Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bankruptcy 
Tourists, 70 BUS. LAW. 719 (2015) (analyzing foreign corporate debtors’ use of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code). 
 4 For an overview of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was actually enacted 
in 2005, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: 
Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 
18–21 (2002). 
 5 American restructuring professionals, for example, are apt to have a different take 
on this as compared with management of debtor-companies. Bondholders are apt to have 
yet another view. 
 6 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 121 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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This stands in contrast to every other corporate reorganization 
system.7 
As such, in the American system, there has largely been a binary 
choice between bankruptcy—chapter 11 or the rare corporate 
chapter 7 case—8  and non-bankruptcy workouts.9  The latter are 
largely a matter of contract, although they can be structured with 
strong doses of coercion.10  And should the latter fail, chapter 11 
stands ready to backstop the effort, again because there is little to 
keep a debtor-firm from using the Bankruptcy Code whenever it 
might be useful. 
Other developed jurisdictions have embraced “pre-insolvency” 
procedures, which lie somewhere between formal bankruptcy and 
contractual workouts.11  The prototype here is the English Scheme 
of Arrangement, which resides within corporate law, rather than 
 
 7 For example, under the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 
(“CCAA”)—often said to be the closest analog to American chapter 11—the basic term 
“debtor company” is defined to mean a firm that: 
(a) is bankrupt or insolvent, 
(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the Winding-up and 
Restructuring Act, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have 
been taken under either of those Acts, 
(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has 
been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or 
(d) is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring 
Act because the company is insolvent; (compagnie débitrice) 
Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-36, § 2(1) (Can.). See 
generally VIRGINIA TORRIE, REINVENTING BANKRUPTCY LAW: A HISTORY OF THE 
COMPANIES’ CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT (2020). 
 8 Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1372 (2007) (“Most corporations that invoke the 
bankruptcy system file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.”). 
 9 State governments have recently enacted a series of bankruptcy-like receivership 
and assignment procedures, the Constitutional viability of which is unclear. STEPHEN J. 
LUBBEN, THE LAW OF FAILURE: A TOUR THROUGH THE WILDS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 
INSOLVENCY LAW, ch. 3 (2018). 
 10 William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1597, 1608–11 (2018). 
 11 For ease, we use “bankruptcy” in the American sense (rather than the European 
sense, where bankruptcy refers only to what Americans would call personal bankruptcy, 
while “insolvency” refers to what Americans call business bankruptcy). Our focus 
throughout is on the financially distressed firm, and not on individuals. 
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insolvency law.12  This is a straightforward procedure, whereby a 
majority of creditors in a single class can agree to bind all creditors 
to a deal.13 
Because a scheme is done under corporate law, rather than 
bankruptcy or insolvency law, the normal European rules that 
prohibit filing away from a firm’s “center of main interests” are 
inapplicable,14  and thus schemes are open to those businesses with 
but a slight connection to England or Wales.15  Debt issued under 
English law, or a small office in London will usually do the trick.16 
Schemes, like chapter 11, are thus available to most global 
businesses.  Standing alone, their reach is more modest, applicable 
to foreign incorporated debtors, yet courts will hesitate to approve 
the schemes unless assured that the result will be accepted abroad.17 
Chapter 15 provides for the commencement of a bankruptcy 
case in the United States that is ancillary or complementary to an 
insolvency proceeding pending in some other country.18  The 
chapter 15 case will support the foreign case and will not be a “full” 
bankruptcy case like a chapter 7 liquidation or a chapter 11 
reorganization.19  Rather chapter 15 allows for the imposition of an 
automatic stay within the United States,20  and the potential 
 
 12 Companies Act 2006, c.46, pt. 26 (Eng.) [hereinafter Companies Act].  See 
generally Adam Gallagher & Victoria Cromwell, English Schemes of Arrangement: A 
Tool for European Restructuring, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38 (2012). 
 13 A scheme requires approval by at least 75% in value of each class of the members 
or creditors who vote on the scheme, being also at least a majority in number of each class. 
Companies Act, supra note 12, § 899(1). 
 14 Horst Eidenmüller, What Is an Insolvency Proceeding?, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53, 
57–58 (2018). 
 15 Susan Block-Lieb, Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without Over-
Reaching), Even After Brexit, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9 (2018). If schemes of arrangement 
were governed by the EU Insolvency Regulation, companies not incorporated in the United 
Kingdom would need to shift their COMI to the United Kingdom to use a scheme. Id. at 
4–5. 
 16 See generally Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1104 (Eng.) (sanctioning 
an English Scheme of Arrangement to restructure a company with a German COMI). 
 17 See id.  See generally Re Stronghold Insurance Company Ltd [2018] EWHC (Ch) 
2909 (Eng.). 
 18 Andrew B. Dawson, Modularity in Cross-Border Insolvency, 93 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 677, 678 (2018). 
 19 William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1081, 1094–95 (2018). 
 20 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1). 
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enforcement of a foreign bankruptcy plan by the U.S. bankruptcy 
court.21 
And thus chapter 15 often provides the missing ingredient that 
allows a scheme to successfully reorganize a non-U.K. corporation. 
A global business thus has a choice of reorganization tools.  At 
a basic level, this choice involves chapter 11 as contrasted with the 
U.K. scheme-chapter 15 combination package.  But in recent years, 
leading jurisdictions have enacted enhanced “pre-insolvency” 
procedures that graft more the features of a full chapter 11 process 
onto the basic scheme architecture.  Provisions that allow for 
termination or assignment of ongoing contracts or “cramdown” of a 
plan on a dissenting class are among those. 
We thus use this paper to consider the wide variety of 
restructuring options available to a global business, with the specific 
focus on how traditional chapter 11 stacks up against the newer 
options.  In Part 1 of the paper, we look at the basic chapter 11-
English scheme dynamic.  As we have noted in prior work, chapter 
11 both benefits and suffers from being the “gold standard” in 
corporate reorganization.22  It provides a flexible process that 
supports such disparate insolvency cases as the (relatively) orderly 
liquidation of Lehman Brothers, the sale-reorganization of General 
Motors and Chrysler, and the more traditional reorganizations of 
most of the nation’s larger airlines.  But with regard to more 
mundane businesses, chapter 11 is complex, somewhat formalistic, 
and seemingly expensive. 
In Part 2 we turn to three newer systems that have been recently 
adopted: namely, the pre-insolvency procedures of the Netherlands, 
Singapore, and England’s own proposal for a new Part 26A 
insolvency system.  The Dutch and British systems were only 
adopted in 2020, whereas Singapore enacted its statute in 2017.23  In 
general terms, these new systems push the pre-insolvency or scheme 
 
 21 In re Lupatech S.A., 611 B.R. 496, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 22 Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 
16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39, 39–41 (2015).  
 23 The amendments to Singapore’s Companies Act came into force on May 23, 2017. 
See Companies (Amendment) Act of 2017, Bill No. 25/2014 (Sing.) [hereinafter 
Companies (Amendment) Act of 2017]. As described further below, the British system 
was adopted in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 crisis, and the Dutch system is effective 
the 1st of January 2021.  See generally Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, 
c.12 (Eng.) [hereinafter Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act]; Art. 370.1 FW (Neth.) 
[hereinafter FAILLISSEMENTSWET].  
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process a bit closer to chapter 11, without going so far as to 
approach some of the drawbacks of the more established U.S. 
reorganization chapter.  Combined with an American chapter 15 
filing, any of these new systems would offer yet another option for 
reorganizing a global business.  And given the uncertainty that 
attends the U.K. scheme process in light of Brexit, the Singapore 
and Dutch statutes have the potential to usurp the role current played 
by schemes.  And presumably these techniques could and would 
also be paired with a U.S. chapter 15 filing to provide further global 
reach. 
In Part 3 of the paper we address the central reason why the 
“chapter 15 plus” approach to reorganization will tend to prevail 
over chapter 11, at least in the near term.  Among other things, we 
note that most of the foreign procedures that will pair with chapter 
15 entail substantially less “process” than chapter 11 itself, which is 
quite abundant in process.  Whether the “chapter 15 plus” package 
has too little process, or simply less process, is unclear. 
While a reduction in the formality of the process might be 
unattractive from the creditor perspective, from the debtor 
perspective there are obvious advantages.  Namely, the less 
procedural, and court-focused “pre-insolvency” procedures greatly 
reduce both the time and transparency associated with 
restructuring.24  And it is the debtor, after all, who will largely drive 
the choice of procedures, inasmuch as all of the procedures we study 
are largely “voluntary.”25  Moreover, we observe that debtors are 
not apt to pay for such moves ex ante—inasmuch as the pricing 
mechanism is apt to have difficulty transmitting the costs of 
reorganization back to the point of issuance in any meaningful 
way.26 
The 2005 adoption of chapter 15 of the Code allows for global 
businesses to pick from among a broad array of business 
reorganization procedures, and then have that procedure enforced 
within the United States.  We ultimately conclude that, at least at 
 
 24 See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence 
of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011). 
 25 Most of the pre-insolvency procedures are voluntary, and while an involuntary 
chapter 11 case is theoretically possible, all indications are that such are quite rare. Susan 
Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not 
Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (1991). 
 26 The result might be different if the costs were truly substantial, but in any of the 
developed economies we address herein, that is not the case. 
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present, for many global businesses the combination of a pre-
insolvency procedure with a chapter 15 filing represents a more 
attractive offer than a chapter 11 case standing alone. 
II. Chapter 11 and English Schemes 
In this part of the paper, we examine the traditional methods of 
restructuring a global business.  One common method is to use 
chapter 11 to cover the entire corporate group.  Another method, 
historically favored by many European debtors, is to reorganize the 
group’s outstanding indebtedness under an English scheme of 
arrangement.  The efficacy of a scheme can be enhanced by 
obtaining recognition of the scheme under chapter 15 in the United 
States, thus extending the restructuring into the other leading 
financial center (New York).  We examine each in turn. 
A. Chapter 11 for the Global Debtor 
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “only a 
person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property 
in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this 
title.”27  Unpacking this a bit, we see that either a person or a 
municipality can be a debtor under the Code.  A person must meet 
one additional requirement, in that they have to either reside in the 
United States or have their domicile, do business, or own property 
in the United States.  Under the Code, “persons” include 
corporations.28 
Note what section 109 does not say: there is no requirement that 
the entity be formed under American law.  Indeed, each year dozens 
of foreign corporations and other foreign entities file bankruptcy 
petitions in the United States.29 
There is also no requirement that the entity be insolvent.30  This 
stands in stark contrast to the laws in most other jurisdictions, where 
bankruptcy and insolvency are synonymous.31 
 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 28 Id. § 101(41). 
 29 Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 3. 
 30 In re Marshall, 403 B.R. 668, 686 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 721 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 31 For example, in England, Scotland, and Wales, a court can only open 
Administration proceedings against a firm if the court “is satisfied that [the] company is 
or is likely to become unable to pay its debts. Insolvency Act 1986, c.45, § 8(1) (Eng.). 
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A non-U.S. entity, contemplating bankruptcy in the United 
States, must have a place of business or property in the United 
States—simply doing business in the United States is not enough.32  
But it is easy to satisfy this rule—any property in the United States 
will do: no matter the value or type.33  And the property could take 
many forms: contracts with New York choice of law clauses have 
been held sufficient.34  Same for retainers held by the debtor’s 
bankruptcy attorneys—which means this requirement could almost 
be self-fulfilling: a foreign company hires an American law firm, 
gives it a retainer, and presto! —its contingent rights in that retainer 
constitute property in the United States.35 
Thus, many global businesses will be able to file to reorganize 
under chapter 11.  Filing is not the same as enforcing the terms of 
the resulting restructuring, however.36  As a general rule, most 
jurisdictions will not recognize the results of an American 
bankruptcy case filed by a non-American corporate entity.37  For 
example, the reorganization of a German corporation under chapter 
11 would likely get little respect in a German court. 
Some jurisdictions also will not recognize an American 
bankruptcy proceeding that purports to restructure debt issued under 
non-American law.  England provides the most notable example of 
this, following the “Gibbs rule,” which holds that English law debt 
can only be revamped in an English proceeding, save when a 
creditor voluntarily submits to a foreign proceeding.38 
As a result, the ability to reorganize a global business, whether 
 
 32 In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 651 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 33 Suntech Power Holdings, 520 B.R. at 413. 
 34 In re Berau Capital Res. Pte Ltd., 540 B.R. 80, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 35 In re B.C.I. Finances Pty Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 36 David P. Stromes, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code’s Automatic 
Stay: Theory vs. Practice, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 284–85 (2007). 
 37 See Lucas Jullian, Grasping at Straws: Exploring PDVSA’s Access to Debtor 
Relief Under Restructuring Regimes, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 863, 901 (2018). 
 38 The rule comes from Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Societe Industrielle et 
Commerciale des Metaux (1890) 25 QBD 399 at 406 (Eng.). For a recent application, see 
Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC (Ch) 59, [44]–[53] (Eng.). Interestingly, 
the United States followed a kind of “internal Gibbs rule” during the nineteenth century–
and perhaps even later.  See e.g., Hornick, More & Porterfield v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ 
Bank, 227 N.W. 375, 379 (S.D. 1929) (holding that state insolvency laws apply only to 
contracts created under the same state’s law); see also Stephen J. Lubben, A New 
Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 357–58 (2013). 
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an individual firm or a group, turns on the ability to apply chapter 
11 extraterritorially.  While some argue otherwise,39  most 
commentators and courts have taken the Code’s statement that a 
bankruptcy estate is comprised of the debtor’s property “wherever 
located and by whomever held,” to be a clear indication that 
Congress intended a worldwide reach.40 
The bankruptcy court can itself enforce a chapter 11 plan against 
any party over which it has jurisdiction.41  Given the United States’ 
status as a financial center—New York City’s status as such, in 
particular—many institutional investors will be within the court’s 
reach. 
Chapter 11 thus operates to reorganize a global business on a 
“pretty good” basis: creditors without ties to the United States will 
be immune from the process, and will only be bound if they 
voluntarily participate.42  But larger bondholders and most banks 
will be bound by the chapter 11 plan. 
The drawbacks of chapter 11 are primarily the same as for a 
domestic, American debtor.  In particular, chapter 11 is a fairly 
formal process, that largely takes place in open court.43  The degree 
of transparency is far beyond what even publicly traded firms are 
accustomed to, and perhaps puts already distressed debtors at a 
disadvantage relative to their non-bankruptcy competitors.  In 
addition, while the cost of American chapter 11 is often overstated 
because of this transparency (which makes the cost very apparent), 
the formality of the process does entail some cost.44 
Closely related to cost and formality is the question of duration: 
 
 39 Shlomo Maza, Yes, No, or Maybe: The Presumption Against Extra-Territoriality 
in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 601, 621–22 (2015). 
 40 Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 726 (1999) (“Most national bankruptcy 
systems, including those of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, claim 
jurisdiction over the assets of a filing debtor wherever located, including assets located in 
other nations.”). 
 41 Lauren L. Peacock, A Tale of Two Courts: The Novel Cross-Border Bankruptcy 
Trial, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 543, 558 (2015). 
 42 Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign Debtors Under 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469, 471 (2006). 
 43 See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 
1624–29 (2009). 
 44 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Through Jevic’s Mirror: Orders, Fees, and 
Settlements, 72 BUS. L. 917, 936 (2017). 
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because chapter 11 is a court-focused reorganization mechanism, 
questions of due process prevent too much compression of the 
process.  Even in Lehman Brothers—undoubtedly involving the 
most extreme facts—the bankruptcy court provided one week of 
notice before the sale to Barclay’s could proceed.45  Most normal 
chapter 11 cases will take substantially longer than that—traditional 
reorganizations often about two years.46 
B. English Schemes of Arrangement (and Chapter 15) 
Traditionally, the global debtor’s leading alternative 
restructuring option to an American chapter 11 case has been an 
English scheme of arrangement.  A scheme of arrangement is a 
procedure under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 under which a 
company may enter into a compromise or arrangement with its 
members or creditors (or any class of them).47  There is no need for 
a company to be insolvent to use a scheme.48 
Under an English scheme, creditors must be divided into 
classes, depending on their rights and interests.49  While the caselaw 
on scheme classification is not nearly as developed as that in chapter 
11, the general rule seems to be that courts draw a distinction 
between differing rights (which could split a class) and differing 
interests (which should not).50  Unlike chapter 11, there is no 
“cramdown” power in a scheme, and is not possible to proceed if 
even one class votes against the overall reorganization.  As a result, 
the debtor-firm has some incentive to group creditors into as few 
classes as possible.  Moreover, not all creditors will necessarily be 
affected by a scheme, and unaffected creditors will not be asked to 
 
 45 Alla Raykin, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 91, 95 (2012). 
 46 Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An 
Empirical Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 586 
(2015). 
 47 Schemes have their roots in an 1870 statute, and before the enactment of federal 
reorganization procedures during the 1930s, some American commentators advocated 
enactment of a scheme statute in the United States. See, e.g., James N. Rosenberg, New 
Scheme of Reorganization, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 529–30 (1917). 
 48 Eidenmüller, supra note 14, at 56. 
 49 See generally Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) [2002] 
WLR 1345, [1] (Eng.). 
 50 See Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) Ltd [2018] EWHC (Ch) 1980, [5] 
(Eng). 
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vote on the scheme. 
Lockup agreements are frequently used in connection with 
schemes, and courts have held that creditors who sign such 
agreements do not need to be separately classified.51  Similarly, it is 
common to pay consent fees to creditors who agree to be “locked 
up” by a specific deadline, and payment of such fees also does not 
automatically result in separate classification of creditors.52  As 
noted before, the overall goal is to get at least 50% in number 
constituting 75% in value of each relevant class of creditors in favor 
of the scheme of arrangement, and only then can it proceed to court 
approval (or “sanction”).53 
Foreign corporations can use the process if there is a “sufficient 
connection” between the foreign company and England for the 
English courts to have jurisdiction to sanction the scheme.54  Debt 
instruments governed by English law provide one basis for finding 
such a connection, but other factors, including a presence in the 
United Kingdom, could form the basis for a scheme.55  As discussed 
further below, often the kind of presence that will support a scheme 
will also provide the basis for finding that the debtor has an 
“establishment” in the United Kingdom for purposes of 1502(2) of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
For example, in Re Stripes U.S. Holdings Inc.,56  a Delaware 
corporation, whose primary asset was the equity of another U.S. 
corporation, filed a scheme.  Its credit facility that was the subject 
of the scheme was governed by English law and accordingly the 
“sufficient connection” test was satisfied.57  Likewise, in Primacom 
Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole,58  a German firm, with no 
English creditors, was able to obtain court approval for a scheme 
because the intercreditor agreement and all finance documents were 
 
 51 Primacom Holding GmbH v. Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC (Ch) 3746, [98] 
(Eng.).  
 52 Re Seat Pagine Gialle SPA [2012] EWHC (Ch) 3686, [16], [18]–[21] (Eng.). 
 53 See Companies Act, supra note 12, § 899(1). 
 54 Id. § 895(2) (defining “company” as any company liable to wound up under the 
Insolvency Act of 1986, which includes “unregistered” companies such as foreign 
corporations). 
 55 Re Noble Group Ltd. [2018] EWHC (Ch) 3092, [100]–[101], [109]–[111] (Eng.). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. (discussing how, with sufficient creditor support, the governing law of a 
debt instrument could be changed to facilitate a scheme). 
 58 See Primacom Holding, EWHC (Ch) 3746, [98]. 
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governed by the law of England & Wales and the parties had 
submitted to the English courts’ jurisdiction.59 
Given London’s status—at least for the present—as an 
important financial center, the scheme itself is apt to be binding on 
the many institutional creditors that have a substantial presence in 
the City.60  But to expand the effects of a scheme, particularly with 
regard to debtors that have either U.S. operations or significant U.S. 
based creditors, it has become common to seek “recognition” of the 
scheme under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.61 
Chapter 15 provides for the commencement of a bankruptcy 
case in the United States that is ancillary or complementary to an 
insolvency proceeding pending in some other country.62  The 
chapter 15 case will support the foreign case and will not be a “full” 
bankruptcy case like a chapter 7 liquidation or a chapter 11 
reorganization.63  The chapter is based on the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency prepared by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).64 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Adam Gallagher & Victoria Cromwell, English Schemes of Arrangement: A Tool 
for European Restructuring, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 91 (2012) (“A creditor based in 
England and Wales that took action in contravention of the terms of the scheme would find 
that not only was its claim rejected by the court, but it might also be liable for contempt of 
court in breaching the scheme.”). 
 61 For examples of schemes recently recognized under chapter 15 in the United 
States, see In re Lecta Paper U.K. Ltd., No. 1:19-BK-13990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 
2020) (order recognizing foreign proceeding, U.K. scheme of arrangement, and granting 
relief); In re Syncreon Automotive U.K. Ltd., No. 1:19-BK-11702 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 
11, 2019); In re NN2 Newco Ltd., No. 7:19-BK-23277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2019) 
(order recognizing foreign proceeding, U.K. scheme of arrangement, and granting relief); 
In re PLC New Look Secured Issuer, No. 1:19-BK-11005 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2019) 
(order granting foreign proceeding and granting related relief); In re Bibby Offshore Servs. 
PLC, No. 1:17-BK-13588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (order granting petition for 
recognition of foreign main proceeding and motion for related relief); In re B.V. Metinvest, 
No. 1:17-BK-10130 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 8, 2017); In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 B.R. 
687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re PLC EnQuest, No. 1:16-BK-12983 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 17, 2016); In re Codere Finance (U.K.) Ltd., No. 1:15-BK-13017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 11, 2015). 
 62 Young Hye ‘Martina’ Chun, Cross-Border Insolvencies: To “Universalize” or to 
Arbitrate?, 17 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 70 (2017). 
 63 See Lia Metreveli, Toward Standardized Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency 
Decisions: Encouraging the United States to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Recent Amendment to 
Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 315, 325 
(2017). 
 64 Id. at 326, 335–36. Section 1501(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the purpose 
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After notice and hearing, section 1517 provides that the 
bankruptcy court must enter an order recognizing the foreign 
proceeding if the proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or a 
foreign non-main proceeding within the meaning of section 1502.65  
A foreign main proceeding is one pending in the country where the 
debtor has the center of its main interests (or “COMI”), while a 
foreign non-main proceeding is one pending in a foreign country 
where the debtor has an “establishment.”66  Cases with but tenuous 
links to England would presumably proceed under the latter 
approach. 
The scheme plus chapter 15 package has the advantage—when 
compared to chapter 11—of being far less transparent.  For 
example, while professionals working in a chapter 11 case are 
subject to extensive disclosure requirements, and their 
compensation must be approved by the bankruptcy court, there are 
no such requirements in either chapter 15 or schemes.  Likewise, in 
a scheme the debtor only need provide creditors with information 
about the proposed reorganization, and even that information can be 
provided in password protected internet sites.67  In chapter 11, on 
the other hand, the disclosure obligations are substantial, and all 
must be made publicly available on the court’s docket.68 
On the other hand, schemes themselves provide none of the 
tools that chapter 11 provides to reject unwanted contracts,69  
recover pre-insolvency payments,70  or sell assets “free and clear” 
 
and the following five objectives of chapter 15: (i) to encourage cooperation between 
courts of the United States (including the United States trustee and appointed fiduciaries) 
and foreign courts in cross-border insolvency cases; (ii) to provide greater legal certainty 
for trade and investment; (iii) to promote the fair and efficient administration of cross-
border insolvencies in a way that protects the interests of all creditors, the debtor and other 
interested entities; (iv) to protect and maximize the value of the debtor’s assets; and (v) to 
facilitate the rescue of financially troubled businesses with the goal of protecting 
investments and preserving employment. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). 
 65 See 11 U.S.C. § 1517. 
 66 See John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International 
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 964–65 (2005) (discussing how Section 1502 defines 
“establishment” as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory 
economic activity”). 
 67 See Companies Act, supra note 12, § 897. 
 68 Hon. Alan S. Trust, Bankruptcy as a Fish Bowl of Disclosure, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 48, 48 (2010). 
 69 See 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
 70 See id. § 547. 
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of claims.71  These limitations are addressed in the newer means of 
reorganizing a global business that we examine in the next part of 
this paper. 
III. New Offerings Abroad 
We use this part of the paper to note three potential competitors 
to the existing methods of reorganizing a transnational firm.  Two 
were enacted just as this paper went to print, but one has been law 
for almost three years now.  As with traditional schemes, all of the 
following procedures could presumably be paired with a U.S. 
chapter 15 filing to give broader reach to the restructuring.  We 
sketch each in turn. 
A. Dutch Scheme 
The Netherland’s current bankruptcy proceedings have many 
different qualities in comparison to Anglo-American law.  In short, 
under the current Netherlands bankruptcy act, known as the Dutch 
Bankruptcy Act, there are three official proceedings: (1) a 
bankruptcy process that applies to companies, other legal entities, 
and natural persons; (2) preliminary and definitive ‘suspension of 
payments’; and (3) debt reorganization of natural persons.72 
The Dutch government is to add two new procedures aimed at 
restructuring a firm to the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act.  The two 
draft bills are called: (1) The Continuity of Enterprises Act I, and 
(2) The Act on the Confirmation of a Private Plan (“ACPP”).73  The 
Enterprise Act I aims to facilitate and provide a statutory basis for 
U.K.-style pre-packs (which Americans would instead call 363 
sales) and the Act of a Private Plan—often referred to by its Dutch 
initials WHOA—74  introduces a scheme-like instrument in the 
 
 71 See id. § 363(f). 
 72 Insolvency Proceedings in the Netherlands, TEN: EURO. NETWORK OF L. FIRMS, 
https://www.ten-law.net/knowledge/insolvency-proceedings-in-the-netherlands/ 
[https://perma.cc/WLX6-GDZ3] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020); see also Oscar Couwenberg 
& Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and Dutch Business 
Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 67–68 (2011). 
 73 Nicolaes Tollenaar & Thomas Bil, Netherlands, GLOB. RESTRUCTURING REV. 
(June 24, 2019), https://globalrestructuringreview.com/review/europe-middle-east-and-
africa-restructuring-review/2019/article/netherlands [https://perma.cc/Y999-LX7G]. 
 74 WHOA stands for “Wet Homologatie Onderhands Akkoord.”  Below, we follow 
the new article numbering in the Dutch Bankruptcy Act and not the one in the proposal for 
the WHOA procedure. See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, arts. 369–387. 
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Netherlands sometimes called “The Dutch Scheme” or even the 
Dutch “Chapter 11.”  The latter procedure has been approved by the 
Dutch Parliament and is effective as of the 1st of January 2021. 
It is the Dutch Scheme that resembles the United States current 
chapter 11 proceedings (and, of course, U.K. schemes), however, 
both proposed Acts are aimed at creating a stronger “safe-haven” 
for those going into in insolvency proceedings.  Our focus in this 
paper is on the “Dutch Scheme.”75 
Under the WHOA, or Dutch Scheme, all types of creditors and 
shareholders, can be bound.76  This is in contrast with existing Dutch 
reorganization law, which is rarely used because it “only binds 
unsecured creditors, making it ineffective against shareholders or 
secured or preferential creditors.”77 
The debtor will have the choice of treating the restructuring as a 
public or a private process.78  The public version would trigger 
automatic EU cross-border recognition, under the EU insolvency 
regulation.  However, under the EU insolvency regime the Dutch 
Scheme only applies to debtors with their COMI in the 
Netherlands.79  Or the debtor may request a private process,80  in 
which case the Dutch scheme becomes subject to recognition under 
any applicable treaties or the domestic private international law of 
the countries in which recognition is sought, including national 
implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, such as chapter 15 
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
The prevailing view, and indeed the view of the Dutch 
government, is that the public version of the Dutch Scheme will not 
fall within the ambit of the EU regulations on judgments, as it is 
expressly construed as an instrument of insolvency law.81  This is in 
 
 75 See N.W.A. Tollenaar, Het Wetsvoorstel Homologatie Onderhands Akkoord 
onder de loep genomen [Scrutinizing the Homologation Private Agreement Bill], 32 
WETENSCHAP [SCI.] 217, 218 (2019), (providing a critical overview of the WHOA). 
 76 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 370.1.  
 77 Tollenaar & Bil, supra note 73 (discussing the previous failures of Articles 143, 
145, and 157 of the previous bankruptcy law in the Netherlands). 
 78 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 369.6.  
 79 See id., art. 369.7; Commission Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) arts. 3.1, 
3.2 (EC).  
 80 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 371.2.  
 81 See P. M.Veder, Internationale Aspecten Van de WHOA: de Openbare en de 
Besloten Akkoordprocedure Buiten Faillissement [International Aspects of the WHOA: 
The Public and Private Agreement Procedure Outside Bankruptcy], 6 TIJDSCHRIFT 
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contrast to U.K. schemes, which are not characterized as insolvency 
proceedings and thus have been argued to fall within the scope of 
the judgment regulations.82  For the private version, the debtor in a 
Dutch Scheme has to seek recognition of the procedure under the 
law of other jurisdictions, even within the European Union. 
That is, the private proceedings—which are heard “in 
chambers”—would receive no automatic recognition under the EU 
insolvency regulation.83  These proceedings would appear to be 
attractive when there are small numbers of holdouts or non-
responsive creditors to an otherwise consensual deal, or—more 
importantly—to international groups of companies with COMI’s or 
assets in different jurisdictions.  In such cases, the EU insolvency 
regulation may cease to be effective.84  The deal could be announced 
upon court approval, thereby minimizing the potential disruption to 
the operating business. 
The Dutch Scheme engrafts several key chapter 11 provisions 
onto its framework, making it far more powerful than the traditional 
U.K. scheme of arrangement.85  For example, plans can be 
“crammed down” on dissenting classes, provided that the dissenters 
are getting their share—measured by the absolute priority rule—86  
of the reorganization value of the company.87  The plan must be 
 
FINANCIERING ZEKERHEDEN EN INSOLVENTIERECHTPRAKTIJK [MAG. FUNDING SEC. & 
INSOLVENCY L.] 53, 53–54 (2019); Kamerstukken II 2018/2019, 35 249, nr. 3 (Neth.). 
 82 See Re Metinvest BV [2016] EWHC (Ch) 79, [31] (Eng.). 
 83 Commission Regulation 2015/848, supra note 79, art. 1 (stating that it is only 
applicable to public restructuring regimes). 
 84 See id. art. 8.1; Veder, supra note 81, at 61; Tollenaar, supra note 75, at 242. If 
used to bind actively objecting dissenters, interesting questions of due process might arise 
if the proponents sought to obtain recognition in the United States.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1506 
(“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by 
this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United 
States.”). 
 85 WHOA! New Dutch Scheme Set to Position the Netherlands as a Restructuring 
Hub, DLA PIPER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/ 
2019/12/global-insight-issue-31/whoa-new-dutch-scheme-set-to-position-the-
netherlands-as-a-restructuring-hub/ [https://perma.cc/XW4T-MQZS]. 
 86 That is, liquidation priority. See Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The 
Implications of the Third Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate 
Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 
Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2006). 
 87 See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, arts. 384.3, 384.4. 
2021 GOOD OLD CHAPTER 11 IN A PRE-INSOLVENCY WORLD 369 
approved by at least one creditor class subject to the plan.88  A class 
accepts the plan if at least two-thirds of the value of the class favors 
the plan.89 
The proposed plan can be filed by the debtor at the start of the 
case, or the process can be initiated by creditors, shareholders, 
employee council or labor unions.90  If the debtor files the case, as 
in chapter 11, there is no court review of the debtor’s eligibility to 
file.  Where someone other than the debtor files the case, the 
petitioning party can ask for the appointment of a restructuring 
expert to help conduct the process.91  The actual in court part of the 
process could be as short as three to five weeks. 
The law allows for the possibility of a temporary stay of four 
months, extendable up to eight months, and the debtors ability to 
“prematurely terminate[]” some contracts while keeping valuable 
contracts.92  As summarized by one group of commentators: 
Plans under the WHOA are in essence free in form and content. 
The intention of the legislator is to minimize the involvement of 
the court and leave a large amount of freedom to the parties 
involved. Apart from some essential safeguards, the WHOA 
provides for a flexible and customizable procedure. Furthermore, 
the court has the power to issue tailored rulings during the process 
aimed at safeguarding the interests of shareholders and/or 
creditors.93 
Notably, the confirmation of a plan is not appealable.94 
In addition to the company itself, creditors can initiate a 
reorganization by requesting the court to appoint an expert, who 
could offer a composition to creditors and shareholders of the 
company.95 
 
 88 See id. art. 383.1. 
 89 Id. art. 381.7. 
 90 Id. art. 371.1. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. art. 373.1. 
 93 WHOA the New Dutch Scheme, ALLEN & OVERY (Oct. 6, 2020), 
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/whoa--the-
new-dutch-scheme [https://perma.cc/MTB2-PYE3]. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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B. Singapore’s “Supercharged” Scheme of Arrangement 
On March 10, 2017, Singapore’s Parliament approved the 
Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017 (the “Act”) to enhance the 
country’s corporate debt restructuring framework.96  The Act 
focuses on corporate “safe-guarding” and “includes major changes 
to schemes of arrangement, judicial management, and cross-border 
insolvency.”97 
The Act modified Singapore’s traditional schemes of 
arrangement to add many features more commonly associated with 
chapter 11.98  In a rather bold attempt to attract cases that might now 
otherwise file in New York or London, the Act provides that “any 
corporation liable to be wound up under this Act” may use the 
scheme process and expands the scope of the “liable to be wound 
up” test to include foreign chartered companies with a “substantial 
connection” to Singapore.99 
The Act allows the debtor to seek a stay or moratorium against 
creditors even in advance of seeking court approval of a scheme, 
and throughout the court process.100  It is expressly contemplated 
that the moratorium might apply extraterritorially, provided the 
court has jurisdiction over affected creditors or their assets.101  Thus, 
just as an American chapter 11 court can bind most financial 
institutions because of their connections with New York, a court in 
Singapore might obtain a similar global reach, at least with regard 
the major financial institutions, all of which are apt to have some 
 
 96 Corinne Ball et al., Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to 
Become Center for International Debt Restructuring, JONES DAY (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/singapore-enacts-new-corporate-61737/ 
[https://perma.cc/KGJ8-52CX]. 
 97 Id. The revised schemes legislation was originally enacted as part of the corporate 
law (or the Companies Act) in Singapore. See generally, Companies (Amendment) Act of 
2017, supra note 23. On July 30, 2020, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 
2018 (“IRDA”) came into effect. The existing statutory regime for Schemes, as amended 
in 2017, has been transplanted into the IRDA, with minor modifications. IRDA §§ 63(3), 
246 (Sing.). 
 98 Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law to Promote International Debt 
Restructuring, JONES DAY (Apr. 2017), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/ 
2017/04/singapore-enacts-new-corporate-bankruptcy-law-to-promote-international-debt-
restructuring [https://perma.cc/L6TA-636X]. 
 99 Previously schemes had been limited to entities incorporated under Singapore law.  
IRDA, supra note 97, § 63(3). 
 100 Re IM Skaugen SE and other matters [2019] 3 SLR 979, [78]–[79] (Eng.). 
 101 See generally IRDA, supra note 97. 
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connection to the island city-state.102 
Courts may now authorize the debtor to incur priority 
unsecured, secured, or super-priority secured financing, provided 
such financing is deemed necessary to enable the debtor to continue 
as a going concern.103 
A “cram-down” provision allows for reorganization over the 
objection of a class of dissenting creditors if, among other things, 
creditors representing a majority in number and holding at least 75 
percent in value of the total claims against the debtor (for which 
votes are actually cast) vote in favor of the proposed scheme.104  In 
a direct echo of chapter 11, the court must also find that the scheme 
is “fair and equitable” to dissenting creditors and does not 
“discriminate unfairly” between two or more classes of creditors.105 
The Act even includes procedures to promote American-style 
prepackaged schemes of arrangement.106  The court may approve a 
scheme of arrangement without any meeting of creditors if, among 
other things: (i) the debtor-company has provided creditors with a 
statement, accompanied by adequate information, explaining the 
effects of the scheme; (ii) notice of the application seeking approval 
of the scheme is provided to every affected creditor and published; 
and (iii) the court is convinced that, if a meeting of creditors were 
convened, the scheme would be approved by the required majorities 
at the meeting.107  While American prepacks involve a pre-filing 
voting process, this latter requirement seems to contemplate 
something a bit less formal. 
 
 102 REPUBLIC OF SING. DEP’T OF STAT., MINISTRY OF TRADE & INDUS., YEARBOOK 
STATISTICS OF SINGAPORE 218–19 (2019), https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/ 
publications/reference/yearbook_2019/yos2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q3V-MLV8]. 
 103 IRDA, supra note 97, § 67. 
 104 Id. § 70(3). 
 105 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).  Interestingly, unlike American law, the IRDA does not 
provide for a way to extinguish existing and outstanding shares, and thus the absolute 
priority rule as codified in the statue provides that: 
where the creditors in the dissenting class are unsecured creditors, the terms of 
the compromise or arrangement must not provide for any creditor with a claim 
that is subordinate to the claim of a creditor in the dissenting class, or any member, 
to receive or retain any property of the company on account of the subordinate 
claim or the member’s interest. 
IRDA, supra note 97, § 70(4)(b)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). 
 106 IRDA, supra note 97, § 71(1). 
 107 Id. § 71(3). 
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C. English Chapter 11? 
Although delayed by other, Brexit-related dramas for several 
years, the U.K. government has long shown some awareness that a 
substantial gap exists between the traditional scheme of 
arrangement, on the one hand, and its other corporate insolvency 
mechanisms, on the other.108  The collapse of several high-profile 
debtors reinvigorated the effort to reform the restructuring laws, 
albeit only to see the same be swamped by a new round of 
governmental distraction. 
In short, a few prime ministers ago, the government announced 
that it would seek to enact a new “restructuring plan” procedure, 
which looks like the old scheme of arrangement process combined 
with specific elements of chapter 11.109  Some had taken to referring 
to this new procedure as “chapter 11 lite.” 
Then, in response to the economic disruption caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Johnson government quickly pushed 
through a series of insolvency reforms.110  Among these, is a new 
Part 26A of the English law Companies Act 2006, now often 
referred to as the “Reorganization Plan” provision, which represents 
the realization of the earlier “chapter 11 lite” proposal.111 
The Reorganization Plan is a new restructuring tool available to 
companies in financial distress that might “affect [] its ability to 
carry on trading as a going concern.”112  There is no insolvency 
requirement.  An application to court in respect of this new process 
 
 108 Irit Mevorach & Adrian Walters, The Characterization of Pre-Insolvency 
Proceedings in Private International Law, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 855, 857 (2020) (“This 
current vogue for pre-insolvency proceedings is the latest phase of a global effort to fashion 
a comprehensive range of debt resolution tools for use at various stages of what 
accountants sometimes refer to as the demise curve of the corporate life cycle.”). 
 109 DEP’T OF BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY, INSOLVENCY AND CORPORATE 




 110 See generally The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill Receives Royal 
Assent, GOV.UK (July 1, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/corporate-
insolvency-and-governance-bill-receives-royal-assent [https://perma.cc/DR7T-8JG7] 
[hereinafter Corporate Insolvency Bill] (“The bill was only introduced to the House of 
Commons on May 20, 2020.  This paper focuses only on new Part 26A, as discussed in 
the text.”). 
 111 Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, supra note 23, sch. 9. 
 112 Id. § 901A. 
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may be made by the company, any creditor or a member of the 
company, or by a liquidator or administrator of the company.113 
In broad terms the new Part 26A is like its scheme 
predecessor—codified in Part 26—save for certain provisions that 
mirror American chapter 11.  Most notably, a Reorganization Plan 
can be imposed on dissenting classes—this is undeniably a 
cramdown provision—unlike traditional schemes, which must be 
approved by each class addressed by the plan.114 
The court will have to find that the plan meets two requirements 
before the cramdown power can be invoked.  First, at least one 
impaired class has to approve the plan.115  This requirement tracks 
a similar requirement in American chapter 11 cramdowns, 
sometimes referred to as the “somebody has to like it” principle,116  
and also seen in the Dutch Scheme discussed above.  In addition, 
the court has to find that the plan is better than the “next best 
alternative.”117  The court has broad discretion to determine what 
the relevant alternative might be.118  This requirement has some 
similarity to the chapter 11 requirement that dissenting creditors 
receive at least as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7 
liquidation—119  often called the “best interests of the creditors” 
test—120  but the British version does not limit the comparison to 
liquidations. 
In schemes of arrangement, and presumably thus also when 
considering a Reorganization Plan, the court has absolute discretion 
over whether to refuse to sanction a Plan even though the necessary 
procedural requirements have been met.121  This may be, for 
example, because a plan is not “just and equitable.”122 
 
 113 Id. § 901C. 
 114 Id. § 901G. 
 115 Id. §§ 901G(2), (5). 
 116 Or at least one of the authors refers to it as such.  STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, AMERICAN 
BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER 148 (2019). 
 117 Corporate Insolvency Bill, supra note 110, §§ 901G(2), (3). 
 118 Id. § 901G(4). 
 119 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
 120 LUBBEN, supra note 116, at 148. 
 121 See Companies Act, supra note 12,  § 901F(4)(c) (“Where the court makes an 
order under this section . . . the court may by the order impose any requirements . . . which 
the court thinks appropriate for facilitating the compromise or arrangement.”). 
 122 See id. The Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 
2020 suggest that the court has absolute discretion and will draw on the well-established 
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The “next best alternative” aspect of the new Reorganization 
Plan potentially opens up the process to the kind of valuation 
disputes that American bankruptcy courts routinely handle in 
chapter 11.  As one commentator notes, 
if our extensive experience in such proceedings is anything to go 
by, there seems every likelihood that mezzanine and junior 
creditors, and other creditors in the capital structure such as 
noteholders and bondholders, will seek to deploy aggressive 
litigation tactics to leverage their positions. This will all be a new 
experience in U.K. restructurings and any company 
contemplating a Plan will need to be ready for challenges in court 
should it be contemplating this new procedure and seeking to 
cram down certain classes of creditors or members.123 
As this article goes to print, Virgin Atlantic Airlines filed the 
first Part 26A proceeding in London,124  and quickly filed for 
recognition of the proceeding in the Southern District of New 
York.125 
IV. Tools for Restructuring a Global Business 
Firms with global operations are likely to run into additional 
coordination issues, on top of the normal ones that occur whenever 
shareholders and creditors of a firm fight over the residue in a 
bankruptcy.  A global business has to deal with a multitude of 
jurisdictions in which its assets are positioned and the same is true 
for creditors of the business, who might be scattered over the planet, 
but who can be bound by one or a diverse set of legal 
arrangements.126  Furthermore, the business and its stakeholders 
may face a bankruptcy procedure in only one of the jurisdictions or 
multiple bankruptcies procedures originating in various 
jurisdictions in which the business operates, hindering the 
 
principles that apply in relation to schemes of arrangement. Corporate Insolvency and 
Governance Act, supra note 23, Explanatory Notes.  
 123 Colin Ashford et al., Part 26A Plans, BROWN RUDNICK (June 26, 2020), 
https://brownrudnick.com/alert/part-26a-plans/ [https://perma.cc/G564-3VQQ]. 
 124 In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. [2020] EWHC (Ch) 2376, [35], [74] (Eng.) 
(“[The court] was provided with detailed and persuasive expert evidence from Professor 
Stephen J. Lubben. . . .”). 
 125 In re Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., No. 1:20-BK-11804 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug, 4, 
2020). 
 126 See Irit Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 1403, 1414 (2018). 
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operations of the group as a whole.127 
A global business in financial distress thus faces challenges to 
keep its assets together, to prevent individual actions of creditors in 
different jurisdictions to lay claim to assets in specific locations and 
to coordinate jurisdictions’ proceedings for its global operations.  
What is the best way for such a global business to proceed, or if a 
choice is available where to start the procedure to maximize the 
chance for a successful restructuring?  Our focus here is on the 
extant law, and not how such law might be improved through 
idealized future legislation, agreements, or treaties. 
To make such a choice not only the available jurisdictional 
options are important, but also what these have to offer the global 
business.  In previous work we specified two essential elements for 
a bankruptcy proceeding:128  asset stabilization and asset separation.  
In that paper we discussed the essential rules a jurisdiction needs to 
take up in its bankruptcy laws, but we did not look at global 
businesses in distress.  In another paper we looked specifically at 
global businesses (large and smaller ones) that were using chapter 
11 as a way out of financial distress.129  Here we bundle our two 
papers and suggest two essential elements are to be added for global 
businesses: 1) worldwide recognition and enforcement, and 2) fair 
treatment of creditors.  Even in a global setting, a reorganization 
option is not essential to the efficiency of a global resolution of 
financial distress, although, as we show in our second paper a 
reorganization option akin to chapter 11 is of interest to global 
businesses. 
A. Multiplicity 
We use the term “multiplicity” to address the specific situation 
in which a business with global operations finds itself: operating in 
a multitude of jurisdictions, owning assets in multiple locations in 
various legal organizational forms, and having financial 
relationships with a diverse and dispersed group of investors.  
Multiplicity encompasses the idea of multi-locality, that is the 
phenomenon that assets and debts are geographically dispersed, and 
that these assets and debts can be governed under a multitude of 
 
 127 Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 297, 318 (2014). 
 128 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22, at 2.  
 129 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 3, at 25. 
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jurisdictionally specific regulations. 
Table 1 below specifies which insolvency or bankruptcy 
elements are needed to address the issue of “multiplicity”, in assets, 
debts and jurisdictions. 
Table 1 The issue of multiplicity 
 Multi-locality of 
assets 
Multi-locality of 

























We proceed by discussing these cells column-wise.  So, we start 
by addressing assets, then debts and finally jurisdictions. 
B. Multi-locality of Assets 
A key assumption in any reorganization procedure is that 
keeping assets together is better than letting the collection of assets 
fall apart.130  If that is untrue, however, a (bankruptcy) liquidation 
proceeding is both sufficient and efficient.  Assuming that keeping 
assets together is worth something and applying that to global 
businesses leads to several observations. 
First, as bringing assets together is a board’s business judgment 
to create value, it is a similar business judgment to distribute assets 
(tangible and intangible) and the build-up of network connections 
over various entities and various locations in a global business.131  
This conscious business decision to distribute assets in order to 
create value is thus of the same order compared to the decision to 
bring specific assets together.  Obviously, boards make mistakes, 
 
 130 Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22, at 5 (“Given the conscious decision of the 
firm’s management to bring this particular constellation of assets together, negating that 
decision upon financial distress would destroy any asset synergies.”). 
 131 See id. at 5–6. 
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but negating that decision at the start of any bankruptcy procedure 
implies a liquidation approach. 
Second, in a global business, having multiple asset pools that 
operate in a networked setting sets it apart from a business operating 
in a single jurisdiction.132  If asset synergies are to be preserved in a 
global business, then this should encompass the protection of its 
pools of assets and network.  Hence, the need for asset stabilization 
and the accompanying tools to make this possible:133  a stay of 
creditors to prevent assets being withdrawn from these pools and 
disrupting the network.  Next, such a stay needs to be accompanied 
with a way to free up funds to continue operations, either in the form 
of a procedure to award priority to post bankruptcy financing on 
existing assets or on future assets of the business.134 
C. Multi-locality of Debts 
The issue in managing corporate financial affairs in any firm is 
that creditors negotiate for preferential treatment—in and outside 
bankruptcy.  This can take the form of higher rates or preferential 
contractual treatment.  Among others, this leads to junior and senior 
debt structures and secured and non-secured positions, and myriad 
combinations of seniority and security. 
A global business can issue debt in a variety of financial centers, 
in various coin and under various jurisdictional specific preferential 
legal schemes in which (pools of) assets can be contracted as 
security.  Depending on the strictness of creditor protection laws in 
jurisdictions in which the firm is doing business, such security 
claims may offer a creditor the right to claim and withdraw assets 
from asset pool(s) in case of bankruptcy or non-payment, in the 
process destroying the asset synergies.  To prevent this from 
happening asset stabilization is needed; it keeps the assets together. 
However, in order to effectuate a sale of assets, these assets need 
to be sold without any claims attached.  This implies a 
transformation of a creditor property-like claim into a monetary 
tort-like one.135  Bankruptcy procedures routinely do so: separating 
the liabilities from the assets and transform a specific claim on an 
 
 132 See id. at 6. 
 133 See id. at 5. 
 134 Id. at 7. 
 135 Id. at 6. 
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asset to a monetary one, equivalent to the value of the asset.136 
Together claim transformation and the ability to offer clean title 
to assets, yield the result that assets in one pool can be kept together 
or pools of assets can be sold as a bundle, potentially preserving 
synergies.  In global businesses with financial affairs spanning 
financial centers, currencies, and jurisdictions, asset separation is 
difficult to achieve.  This depends on how jurisdictions co-operate 
with respect to recognition of each other rules and enforcement 
methods. 
D. Multi-jurisdictionalism 
With multiple jurisdictions, asset stabilization and asset 
separation become problematic as local pools of assets and local 
creditors in a specific jurisdiction may act without regard to a global 
business’ network synergies and asset pool dependencies.137  Next, 
jurisdictions have obvious differences in contractual rules and 
policy preferences in bankruptcy.  This multi-jurisdictionalism 
leads to additional coordination and creditor treatment issues.  
Illustrative in this respect are the cases of Hanjin Shipping and 
Swissair. 
1. Hanjin Shipping, South Korea 
Hanjin Shipping was the largest Korean container transporter 
and one of the 10 largest worldwide.138  It became severely 
financially distressed due to long term excess capacity in the global 
shipping market.139  After having tried for months to reach a debt 
restructuring with its largest creditors, Hanjin Shipping filed for 
receivership in August 2016 with the Korean Bankruptcy Court and 
sought court protection in more than 40 countries (including in the 
United States with a chapter 15 filing).140 
 
 136 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1978) (defining claim as a “right to an equitable 
remedy . . .”). 
 137 See Irit Mevorach, A Fresh View on the Hard/Soft Law Divide: Implications for 
International Insolvency of Enterprise Groups, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 505, 511 (2019). 
 138 See Costas Paris & In-Soo Nam, Move by South Korea’s Hanjin Shipping Roils 
Global Trade, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-hanjin-
shipping-to-sell-healthy-assets-to-rival-1472611190 [https://perma.cc/S3RY-DYAV]. 
 139 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2016, at 52–
53, U.N. Sales No. E.16.II.D.7 (2016). 
 140 See In-Soo Nam, Hanjim Shipping Asks Creditor to Restructure Debt, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 25, 2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/hanjin-shipping-asks-creditor-to-
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After the bankruptcy declaration became public, creditors all 
over the world tried to confiscate assets.141  Hanjin vessels had 
trouble accessing ports as no promise could be given that fees and 
services could be paid.142  Ships, goods and sailors were stuck in 
ports or at sea for weeks or even months.143  Without financial 
support to help unlock its assets and goods, Hanjin Shipping’s 
operations quickly withered away.144  The company announced 
plans to shut down offices around the world, lay-off workers, sell 
assets, and dismantle its service network.145  In February 2017, the 
Korean Bankruptcy Court declared Hanjin Shipping Co. declared 
bankrupt, with a court order to liquidate the company.146 
In August 2017, the South Korean bankruptcy trustee reported 
that US$ 220 million was collected from the sale of Hanjin’s 
assets.147  In short, 2% of total debt of US$ 10.5 billion Hanjin owed 
to its creditors.148 
2. Swissair, Switzerland149 
Swissair, a Swish flag carrier, abruptly ceased flying on 2 
 
restructure-debt-1461582330 [https://perma.cc/LEE2-VB2G]; Joyce Lee & Se Young 
Lee, Hanjin Shipping Files for Receivership, as Ports Turn Away Its Vessels, REUTERS 
(Aug. 31, 2016) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hanjin-shipping-debt-
idUSKCN11603N [https://perma.cc/VP9U-FDJQ]; Minjee Kim, Cross-Border Insolvency 
and Debt Restructuring Law Reform in Singapore: Reflections on the Hanjin Shipping 
Case, 19 AUS. J. ASIAN L. 1–13 (2019). 
 141 Stephen J. Lubben, Lack of Planning Hampers Hanjin Shipping Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/business/dealbook/lack-of-
planning-hampers-hanjin-shipping-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/3VFG-LUZ7]; 
Paris & Nam, supra note 138. 
 142 Peter Ryan, Hanjin Shipping Collapse in South Korea Leaves Freight Stranded, 
Portends Weakening Global Economy, ABC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2016) 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-05/south-korean-shipping-collapse-leaves-freight-
stranded/7814768?section=business [https://perma.cc/8XCS-CRS3]. 
 143 Stranded Hanjin Crew Denied Shore Leave, MAR. EXEC. (Oct. 5, 2016) 
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/stranded-hanjin-crew-denied-shore-leave-
in-seattle [https://perma.cc/NWJ9-TFBK]. 
 144 See Lee & Lee, supra note 140. 
 145 Paris & Nam, supra note 138. 
 146 In-Soo Nam, Hanjin Shipping is Declared Bankrupt, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2017) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hanjin-shipping-is-declared-bankrupt-1487296151 
[https://perma.cc/B8XL-X5SM]. 
 147 Paris & Nam, supra note 138. 
 148 Id. 
 149 The case of Swissair is taken and slightly adapted from Oscar Couwenberg & 
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October 2001.150  It became financially distressed due to an 
aggressive acquisition strategy of smaller airline groups at the end 
of the 1990s, incurring large operational losses, a 1998 crash of a 
New York to Geneva flight in Nova Scotia, Canada which in turn 
resulted in reputational losses, and finally the September 11th 2001 
attacks in the United States, causing an already impending liquidity 
crisis to spiral out of control.151  At the specific date in October it 
was unable to pay for fuel and landing fees.152  Tens of thousands of 
passengers, crew and planes were stranded worldwide.153  
Swissair’s key figures show its size: it had total assets of € 11.2 
billion, € 8.4 billion debts, sales of € 8.1 billion and 68,000 
employees.154 
The Swiss federal government decided to intervene and provide 
liquidity to Swissair in the form of bridge loans up to 450 million 
Swiss francs (€ 281 million).155  This allowed Swissair to operate 
the days after bankruptcy and helped to prevent losing slots and 
gates at airports, save jobs, passengers to their destinations, crews 
and planes back home and keep Switzerland connected with the 
wider world. 
In the weeks following the bankruptcy, an asset sale scheme was 
devised in which Crossair Ltd Co., the short-haul flight subsidiary 
 
Stephen J. Lubben, Not a Bank, Not a SIFI; Still Too Big to Fail, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 53, 53–80 (2019).  
 150 Alistair Osborne, Swissair Files for Bankruptcy, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 1, 2001), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2735944/Swissair-files-for-bankruptcy.html 
[https://perma.cc/QC8U-AXGD]. Its debt restructuring moratorium was provisionally 
approved on October 5, 2001 by the district courts in Zurich and Bülach, Switzerland. See 
Legal Status and Powers of the Administrator in the Swissair Group Provisional Debt 
Restructuring Moratorium, LIQUIDATOR OF SWISSAIR, https://www.liquidator-
swissair.ch/en/proceedings/important-questions.htm [https://perma.cc/S7LJ-A2RZ] (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2020). 
 151 Swissair: Proud Past, Grim Future, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1575798.stm [https://perma.cc/Z53T-MAGT]. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Thousands Stranded in Airline Crisis, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1577609.stm [https://perma.cc/CKF4-2ZD7]. 
 154 See generally SAIRGROUP, ANNUAL REPORT (1999), http://www.sr692.com/ 
misc/printed/reports/pdf/SWR1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/84TS-4ATQ]. Swiss francs are 
converted at an exchange rate of €/CHF = 0.625. Id. at 9. 
 155 State Rescues Swissair, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/1576636.stm [https://perma.cc/Q9XZ-7FKN]. 
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of Swissair, took over the bankrupt parent’s operations.156  Crossair 
was funded by the federal government, UBS and Credit Suisse.157  
Crossair was renamed to Swiss International Airlines.158  In 2005 
Swiss International Airlines was taken over by Germany’s 
Lufthansa for 340 million Swiss francs (€ 212 million).159 
The similarities between Hanjin Shipping and Swissair are 
worth noting.  Both firms own expensive specialized assets (ships 
and planes), operate a global network of transport lines, are in need 
of liquidity to ensure operational continuity (port access and landing 
rights, and for both fuel costs), faced adverse market circumstances 
(overcapacity) and have their employees travel the globe.  When the 
firms became severely financially distressed, the outcome differed 
dramatically.  Swissair was kept alive the first weeks of the 
bankruptcy proceedings by a governmental line of credit and then 
rescued with the help of banks and a government backed asset sale.  
Hanjin Shipping was not offered such help in the early stages of 
bankruptcy and was also not able to arrange a debt restructuring, or 
an asset sale to save its business.  In the end, for Hanjin Shipping a 
forced liquidation ensued. 
E. Recognition, Enforcement and Fair Treatment 
As the Hanjin Shipping case illustrates, value can easily be lost 
in a forced unorderly bankruptcy.  The Swissair case shows how 
governmental involvement can mitigate such losses.  However, it is 
not to be expected that just any global business in financial distress 
can rely on government help, even apart from the question which 
government should step up to such a rescue in a truly multinational 
business.160 
To prevent the loss of value in the Hanjin Shipping case, the 
 
 156 Mark Milner, Syndicate Agrees to Bail Out Swissair, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2001), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/oct/23/internetnews.business2 
[https://perma.cc/B2MZ-CSNE]. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Swiss International Air Lines Ltd. History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/swiss-international-air-lines-ltd-
history/ [https://perma.cc/HVC6-79GR] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
 159 Kevin Done, Lufthansa Pays €217m for Swiss Takeover, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 25, 
2008), https://www.ft.com/content/e1d4e966-fa89-11dc-aa46-000077b07658 [https://per 
ma.cc/63K2-PMDH]. 
 160 In other work we show how bankruptcies of large firms end, among others with 
governmental help. See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 149. 
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firm needed 1) a worldwide automatic stay and additional liquidity 
to free up ships and cargo to preserve value, 2) an ability to monetize 
claims and offer clean title to buyers, 3) a formal enforcement 
regime to act in various jurisdictions and 4) a form of insolvency 
oversight that ensures fair treatment of creditors.  Asset stabilization 
and separation are not sufficient if these do not extend beyond a 
single jurisdiction, these need to extend over multiple 
jurisdictions.161 
In that regard, it would already work if a jurisdiction, e.g., 
Singapore, could project its stabilization and separation rules across 
borders and that those jurisdictions would recognize these powers 
and enforce decisions made by the bankruptcy controlling party.162  
However, this is not sufficient to solve the issue of fair treatment.  
As Melissa Jacoby has noted in the domestic context, “[t]he 
bankruptcy system’s very premises—not enough to go around, 
changing legal entitlements without consent—make its procedures 
particularly vulnerable to public distrust.”163  These same basic 
concerns are, if anything, more extreme in the global setting. 
With multiple jurisdictions involved, each with specific 
schemes of contractual security, creditors cannot be sure to be 
treated fairly according to their contractual rights, nor when 
proceeds have to be shared that their share is fair with respect to 
other creditors.164  The risk of unfair treatment, or outright 
expropriation, generates an incentive to hold out, (local) asset runs, 
and (lengthy) legal battles in various courts.165 
Fair treatment necessitates that a bankruptcy procedure in order 
to have global effect specifies classification rules, distribution rules 
and be able to bind creditors either willingly or involuntarily to the 
outcome of the distributive part of the bankruptcy procedure.  In a 
single jurisdiction, this part of the procedure is part and parcel of a 
 
 161 See generally Jay L. Westbrook, Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global 
Market: The Universalist System and the Choice of a Central Court, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 
1479 (2018). 
 162 A global insolvency regime might also do this trick, but this seems too much to 
ask for the time being. See id. at 1484. 
 163 Melissa A. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 1715, 
1739 (2018). 
 164 Cf. Sally McDonald Henry, Chapter 11 Zombies, 50 IND. L. REV. 579, 590 (2017). 
 165 Edward J. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 457 (2011); see Ian 
Fletcher, Cross-Border Cooperation in Cases of International Insolvency: Some Recent 
Trends Compared, 6 TUL. CIV. L.F. 171, 173 (1991). 
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local jurisdiction legal contractual make-up.  It is part of the reason 
why foreign companies find chapter 11 or the English scheme of 
arrangement attractive: it specifies such rules and is able to bind 
creditors in other jurisdictions.166  However, that might not happen 
in an insolvency of a global business as multiple classification and 
distribution schemes can be applicable.  And these may very well 
conflict one another.167 
This leads to the follow-on observation that to secure such a fair 
treatment, the procedure needs to offer creditors an impartial 
supervisor—a trustee, judge, monitor, or creditors’ committee—to 
oversee debtor and creditor behavior, and to coordinate and steer 
legal actions in the various jurisdictions to secure fair treatment.  
This especially relates to asset separation as selling assets, releasing 
assets or leaving them to creditors needs a supervisor to secure 
outcomes that benefit all. 
Having such rules to ensure fair treatment is then only a small 
step towards reorganization as the distributive rules may allow for 
a hypothetical sale to current claim owners.  However, this is not 
essential for efficiency as asset synergies and network might be sold 
together to a bidder, even if finding such a bidder takes time.168 
F. Procedural Contenders for Global Businesses in Distress 
Table 2 below gives an overview of procedural contenders for 
global businesses in distress, specifying their main regulatory tools. 
 
 166 See Westbrook, supra note 161, at 1480–81. 
 167 For example, a conflict may ensue with the U.K. scheme of arrangement 
concerning the Gibbs rule. See Kannan Ramesh, The Gibbs Principle, 29 SING. ACAD. L.J., 
42, 74 (2017). 
 168 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 22. 
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Table 2 Dealing with multiplicity in proceedings 




















169 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Priority 
funding Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Trustee 
 No No No Yes Yes No
170 No 
Clean title 
 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distribut-
ion rules Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Classific-
ation rules Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Binding 
creditors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cram 
down Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The first thing to note is that many of the procedures either 
alone, or in combination with chapter 15, offer the same basic set of 
tools that chapter 11 provides.  For example, Singapore’s scheme 
offers essentially everything that chapter 11 does, and when 
combined with a chapter 15, it becomes binding in both Singapore 
and U.S. courts.  It is easy to imagine that covering many business’ 
creditors in full. 
The United Kingdom’s ongoing role in Europe is, of course, 
uncertain.  But if London remains a global financial center, it may 
offer a wide jurisdictional reach for its new Part 26A, especially 
when combined with New York and chapter 15.  If Amsterdam’s 
role as a financial center grows post-Brexit, the new Dutch Scheme 
would seem to provide an obvious replacement for the U.K. process.  
Singapore offers a similar package focused on the Pacific. 
Furthermore, the Singaporean and Dutch contenders offer a 
regulatory oversight element that chapter 11, chapter 15 and U.K. 
Part 26A lack.  If such oversight would indeed prove to be 
instrumental in preventing or mitigating strategic expropriative 
 
 169 The United Kingdom has adopted a moratorium law, but it has little import for the 
larger businesses that we examine in this paper. See Corporate Insolvency and Governance 
Act, supra note 23, § A2. 
 170 A court appointed restructuring expert can be appointed on request of the 
petitioning party. See FAILLISSEMENTSWET, supra note 23, art. 42A.  
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behavior it adds to the ex ante attractiveness of these two schemes. 
The “Gibbs rule” would seem to present a problem for both the 
Dutch and Singapore systems if bond debt continues to favor 
English law after Brexit.  But the problem would seem to apply only 
to those creditors who are subject to jurisdiction in neither the 
location of the proceeding or the United States.  For example, if a 
recalcitrant creditor did pursue action on English law debt in the 
English courts, and such action would be contrary to a worldwide 
moratorium imposed by a Singapore court, then, if the creditor is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court, such a creditor 
would face the sanction of the Singapore court. 
But the problem is also easily avoided by using (or changing 
over to) New York law in place of English law in the debt 
instruments, and then enforcing the Singapore proceeding through 
U.S. chapter 15, even if the creditor is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Singapore.  Moreover, unless the debtor actually had 
significant assets in the United Kingdom, the prospect of a “rogue” 
judgment in the jurisdiction, simply based on a choice of law clause, 
would present little problem for the overall reorganization. 
The table also makes clear why the traditional U.K. scheme, 
even when paired with a chapter 15 filing, might soon fade as a key 
tool in restructuring global businesses.  The scheme plus chapter 15 
approach offers greater flexibility than an old-fashioned chapter 11 
case.171  But a scheme itself offers a less robust restructuring tool 
than chapter 11, and once the United Kingdom is no longer part of 
the European Union, its attraction to European businesses might 
quickly fade in the face of other options. 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s proposed Part 26A 
might have some real advantages given the lead that the United 
Kingdom already has with traditional schemes.  Any move away 
from schemes is not apt to benefit chapter 11 itself, but rather the 
combined package of “enhanced scheme” plus chapter 15 looks 
more likely to come out on top.  Enhanced scheme reorganization 
systems—like the Dutch, Singapore, and new U.K. systems—
benefit from offering the powerful features of chapter 11, without 
the necessarily embracing litigation-centric approach to 
restructuring seen in chapter 11. 
 
 171 In re Avanti Commc’ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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G. And an Argument for Chapter 11 Versatility 
Although the arguments above imply that chapter 11 will lose 
“market share” to these contenders, its versatility is often 
underestimated.  We see two additional arguments that may give 
chapter 11 an edge over the others as the tool of choice for 
restructuring global businesses.  First, at present, most chapter 15 
petitions are presented to the courts in Delaware and New York 
without opposition.  Indeed, the vast bulk of the creditors are likely 
contractually precluded from objecting under the terms of the 
lockup agreement they signed in connection with the scheme that 
undergirds the chapter 15 petition.  It is not clear that these 
agreements actually preclude making arguments in American 
courts, but given that the contracts are enforceable under non-U.S. 
law, in foreign courts, no creditor has yet been willing to take that 
chance.172 
Moreover, true dissenters are presently able to sell their 
positions in relatively deep and liquid distressed debt markets.173  
But if market conditions were to change—and liquidity in debt 
markets plainly cannot be taken for granted—174  these dissenters 
might find their path to exit closed.  As a result, they might take a 
more active (and contentious) role in both scheme and chapter 15 
hearings.  It also remains to be seen how U.S. bankruptcy courts 
will react to American debtor-firms using foreign procedures to 
reorganize their own capital structures.  An unfavorable ruling on a 
chapter 15 petition, wherein an American company seeks 
recognition for its restructuring under Singapore law, for example, 
could have profound effects on the present global reorganization 
structure. 
Thus, market conditions or abuse might lead to the development 
of unfavorable chapter 15 caselaw.  Without the ability to make 
 
 172 See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Private Benefits Without Control? 
Modern Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 145, 164 (2018). 
 173 Katherine Doherty & Allison McNeely, Distressed Debt Traders Have Tons of 
Cash and Nothing to Buy, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2019-07-19/distressed-debt-traders-have-tons-of-cash-and-nothing-to-buy 
[https://perma.cc/VJ6W-SPEZ]. 
 174 Andrew Osterland, Investors Worry Liquidity Crisis Looms on Fixed Income 
Horizon, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/03/investors-worry-
liquidity-crisis-might-loom-on-fixed-income-horizon.html [https://perma.cc/Z5U3-
HMMS]. 
2021 GOOD OLD CHAPTER 11 IN A PRE-INSOLVENCY WORLD 387 
foreign “pre-insolvency” procedures binding in the United States, 
the (near) worldwide reach of chapter 11 might overcome the 
current perception that chapter 11 is too complex and expensive. 
Second, if future global debtors are more deeply distressed, they 
might also benefit from the use of chapter 11.  At present most 
global debtors are able to reorganize their capital structures alone, 
since they key problem is simply over-indebtedness.  But extreme 
liquidity in debt market, combined with the “cov light” 
phenomenon,175  might mean that the next round of global debtors 
in distress are in need of something more, namely an operational 
and financial restructuring.  That is, they might reach the point of 
restructuring either later in the cycle of distress, or only when the 
distress is otherwise quite severe.  This too might make chapter 11 
more attractive than any of the “stripped down” procedures we have 
examined in this paper.  Indeed, chapter 11 is the only 
reorganization system presently on offer that could provide a full 
organizational restructuring of a global debtor. 
V. Conclusion 
Global debtors are seemingly on the verge of a wealth of choices 
with regard to their restructuring.  While in the past the United 
States and the United Kingdom have dominated in this area, the 
combined effects of Brexit and the increasing ability to get the best 
features of chapter 11 without needing to embrace all of chapter 11 
itself, mean that both jurisdictions are apt to lose some of this 
business going forward.  If that so happens, the United States may 
then maintain a subsidiary role in global restructuring through 
chapter 15, and the bankruptcy court’s broad willingness to 
recognize foreign proceedings thereunder.  The United Kingdom’s 
future role is largely dependent on market acceptance of the new 
Part 26A Reorganization Plan process, and its continued role in the 
global financial system post-Brexit.  On the other hand, chapter 11 
may still continue its dominating worldwide role in case global 
firms in distress need its operational and financial restructuring 




 175 Christian Pilkington & Ian Wallace, Restructuring the Next Wave of Cov-lite Debt, 
WHITE & CASE (July 11, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/ 
restructuring-next-wave-cov-lite-debt [https://perma.cc/Q5XH-CE34]. 
388 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
 
